Incident Response Runbook: Vendor / Supply Chain Breach
1. Identification
- Triggers: Public disclosure of a breach by a third-party vendor (e.g., GitHub, CircleCI, Okta), notification from a partner, or supply-chain intelligence alerts.
- Initial Triage: Determine the scope of the vendor's integration with the environment. Identify which credentials, tokens, or data were shared with them.
2. Containment
- Revoke Integration Access:
- If the vendor holds an active API key or Service Principal (SP) credential, revoke it immediately in Azure Active Directory (Entra ID) or Azure Key Vault.
- For federated identity credentials (OIDC), remove the federation trust for the breached vendor to block token issuance.
- Block Network Traffic:
- Temporarily block inbound/outbound webhooks and API calls to/from the vendor using NSGs or WAF rules.
3. Eradication & Investigation
- Query
AuditLogsandSigninLogsto check if the vendor's Service Principal or integration account was used to access the environment suspiciously. - Look for unexpected resource creation, RBAC modifications, or data access events correlated with the vendor's identity.
- Review the
STALE.mdinventory (via H5 script) to identify any long-lived secrets the vendor might have possessed.
4. Recovery
- Generate new credentials or re-establish federated identity trusts only after the vendor has confirmed the incident is remediated.
- Re-enable network traffic and webhooks.
- Monitor the vendor's integration closely for 7 days.
5. Lessons Learned
- Ensure least privilege is enforced for all third-party integrations (e.g., avoid giving Contributor access when Reader suffices).
- Migrate from long-lived secrets to OIDC federated credentials for CI/CD and vendor integrations wherever possible.